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Abstract 
 
          Traditional studies of returns-to-schooling have been generally concerned with 
several issues like the omitted variable bias, error-in-measurement bias and the 
endogeneity of schooling. While such inquiries are of much empirical importance, this 
paper tries to ask a different but non-negligible question: what should be interpreted from 
the individual ability measure per se in the wage equation? With data from well 
documented national surveys in the U.S., this paper is able to make a simple but 
fundamental argument: IQ level per se, holding all other personal characteristics constant, 
has negligible net effect in determining one’s income level and thus should not be used as 
the proper measure of the ability we want to quantify in the wage-determining process, 
i.e., the very ability to earn income.  
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
          Since the seminal work of Mincer (1958), the relationship between 
schooling and wage has kept economists fascinated for the past five decades. The 
conventional wisdom goes that as one becomes more educated, his/her income 
from work tends to increase. Following this logic, the most instinctive approach 
to the problem would start by estimating the following equation: 
 i i i iW S X      
where iW  is individual i ’s income, measured in hourly wage, iS refers to years 
of schooling completed, iX  represents a vector of control variables, and i  the 
random error. (Card 1994) This seemingly simple relation has drawn ensuing 
debates in the past decades over two major issues: the omitted variable bias 
(OVB) and the endogeneity of schooling. The simplicity of the above equation 
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suffers from violation of the very first OLS assumption, i.e., ( ) 0E S  . In the 
job market signaling model proposed by Michael Spence (1973), more educated 
individual receives higher income only because education is a signal of higher 
ability; the correlation between schooling and wage may be the result of an 
omitted variable, most probably individual ability, which influences both 
schooling and wage, even though education does not increase one’s productivity. 
Thus, in the past decades, much effort has been devoted to the isolation of the net 
effect of schooling on wage by inclusion of plausible omitted variables, e.g., 
individual ability. The second problem concerning the simple set-up is that, as 
schooling is not randomly assigned across the population, individuals make their 
own decisions regarding schooling based on a number of different factors (most 
likely including anticipated income), and thus the problem of endogeneity of 
schooling arises. Indeed, the mounting debates existing in the literature revolve 
around the treatment of these two concerns: (1) how to quantify one’s ability in 
separation with other variables; and (2) the choice of instrumental variables to 
filter schooling. (Griliches 1977) 
 
          As much as the above two problems are concerned, much progress has 
been made in the literature.
1
 In recent years, broader topics developed from the 
initial exploration of returns on human capital have also been extensively studied, 
with increasing knowledge added to the literature. While interesting issues 
remain in these two basic directions, this paper makes no attempt to compete in 
adding to the knowledge of either endogenous schooling decisions or the ability 
bias symptom. Rather, we notice that so far, there seems to be no paper that has 
attempted to narrow the focus on examining the ability per se, i.e., an in depth 
examination of what actually should be interpreted from the ability. With this 
inquiry, this paper tries to answer a simple but non-negligible question: Does 
higher IQ really give you higher income?  
 
          As a motivation of this paper, we notice that in order to alleviate the 
apparent OVB problem, various papers have introduced ability as measured by 
IQ scores, among others, into the wage equation. In Griliches (1976), where he 
used a two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework to remedy the endogeneity 
problem, IQ and another measure, scores on the Knowledge of the World of 
Work (KWW) test, have been used to proxy individual ability. Based on his work, 
many subsequent studies continue to use similar sets of variables, in which IQ is 
always used as the endogenous ability measure,
 2
 to address different issues 
aroused in the broader direction of returns on human capital. However, such 
treatment of ability has brought imperfections in virtually any model examining 
the schooling and wage relation. So what goes wrong? To answer this question, 
researchers have tried various methods including the inclusion of more potential 
instruments to further filter the ability measure. Yet, there seems to be little, if 
                                                          
1 Card (1994) has provided a good summary of the literature concerning these two issues up to his 
time. More empirical works can be referred but not limited to Harmon and Walker (1995), Callan 
and Harmon (1999), Rummery, Vella and Verbeek (1999), Denny and Harmon (2000), Trostel, 
Walker and Woolley (2002). More recent works on models and methods can be referred but not 
limited to Harmon and Oosterbeek (2000), Dearden and Sianesi (2001), Harmon, Oosterbeek and 
Walker (2003), Blundell, and Dearden and Sianesi (2005). 
2 In many later works, IQ is used more often as the measure of individual ability than KWW, in 
which case, KWW is used as an IV to filter the ability factor we want in estimating the wage 
equation. 
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any, success in reconciling those counter-intuitive results, e.g., negative ability 
coefficient
3
, inconsistency in the direction of ability bias
4
, and so on. Motivated 
in this regard, this paper proposes a new direction: maybe IQ is indeed useless in 
the determination of wage. This bold proposal may seem to be fragile, but as we 
are going to show, level of IQ per se does have little, if any, effects on one’s level 
of expected income, given that the coefficient on IQ in the wage equation is truly 
unbiased or near unbiased. In other words, the particular Intelligence quotient 
you possess, holding all other personal characteristics constant, may bear little 
weight on the determination of your income level, if at all.  
 
          To perform our analysis, we proceed as follows: Section II specifies the 
model we will estimate and justify our use of the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) rather than standard OLS or otherwise 2SLS as the estimation 
framework; Section III carries on a discussion on the data we use, the variables 
concerned, and some limitations to our sample; Section IV presents and discusses 
our major results obtained; Section V is devoted to a conjecture on the 
specification of the wage equation inspired by our results in the previous section; 
Section VI concludes. 
 
 
II. The Model 
 
          To start our analysis, we first specify the functional form of the wage 
equation we would like to estimate. Without distraction from our purpose, we 
adopt the typical log wage equation estimated in the literature, which has a 
convenient form as: 
 'LW S A X           (1) 
where LW is the natural logarithm of the wage rate, S is years of schooling 
completed, A is a measure of ability, X is a vector of other wage determining 
variables containing experience in years, tenure in years, dummy for residency in 
the southern states, dummy for residency in metropolitan areas and year 
dummies,
5
 and  the random error summarizing the effects of other sources of 
differences in wage rates. This log specification is widely justified by appealing 
to the well-recognized stylized fact from large cross-sectional data, such as the 
Current Population Survey in the US, that there exists a linear relationship 
between log wages and years of schooling.
6
 To examine the role of IQ as a 
measure of the kind of ability we are interested in, i.e., the ability to earn income, 
we treat IQ as a proxy for the ability in the wage equation and we are indeed 
interested in estimating the following equation: 
 'LW S IQ X        (2) 
                                                          
3 Griliches (1976) and Blackburn and Neumark (1992) 
4 Blackburn and Neumark (1995) 
5 The choice of control variables is subject to debates in the literature. However, to not distract our 
analysis, we adopt a conservative stance and follow a wide-recognized set of control variables 
included in the X-vector in the literature, which is similar to Griliches (1976) and Blackburn and 
Neumark (1992). 
6 See a much more complete discussion in Card (1995). 
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where the specification is the same as in (1) except that IQ  is now  in place of 
A , and we drop the constant  for simplicity, without loss of generality.  
 
          Although simple OLS has reduced the OVB problem by the inclusion of 
many other explanatory variables including ability measured by IQ, errors-in-
variables bias arises as the ability may be measured with error, i.e., the IQ 
measure may be imperfect, which is obviously the case. To see this, we do the 
following: If   is the measurement error, IQ and ability can be related in the 
following simple way: 
 IQ A     (3) 
where ( ) 0E   . The interpretation of   as measurement error makes it 
reasonable to assume that it is uncorrelated with , ,S A X and the error term   in 
(1). Then, substituting (3) into (1), we obtain: 
 ( ) ' ( )LW S IQ X              (4) 
It is easy to show that in general, if at least one of the regressors is measured with 
error, the OLS estimates of all the regression coefficients can be asymptotically 
biased.
7
 
 
          To resolve the above problem, the conventional approach would be the 
application of 2SLS, as is practiced universally across the literature. Although 
2SLS has largely improved the estimation, it relies on the critical assumption that 
the random errors in the wage equation have the same conditional mean. This 
homoskedasticity assumption has greatly restricted the generalization of the 
model and may cause many results to fail in the presence of any robustness tests. 
To improve estimation, we therefore apply GMM to estimate a hereroskedastic-
robust wage equation, which reduces the restrictions on the regression as many as 
possible.
 8
 To estimate (2) using GMM, we rewrite (1) into the following form: 
 'i i iy z     (5) 
where i iy LW ,  ' 1iz S A X ,  ' '     . Under the 
efficient GMM assumptions, which we will testify, we would expect the result to 
be an unbiased wage equation that can allow us to analyze the net effects of 
respective explanatory variables on wage determination. This asymptotic 
unbiasedness provides us with some grounds to draw plausible conclusions on 
any characteristics found in the regressors and their corresponding coefficients, 
including the purpose of our investigation: is IQ statistically significant in 
explaining for wage differentials, holding all other personal characteristics 
constant? In the following, we will first concentrate on estimating (2) using a 
standard OLS, assuming IQ is an error-free measure. Then we apply GMM to 
                                                          
7  Because ( , ) ( ) [( ) ] ( )Cov IQ E IQ E A Var            , it can be shown that 
( ) ( )pOLS Var         where  is a negative term under reasonable conditions concerning 
the covariance of IQ and schooling. Thus, 
OLS  is biased upward for schooling.  
8 However, the efficiency of GMM still relies on mainly two assumptions: 1. Instruments are valid. 
2. Inner product of the instrument vector and the error term forms a Martingale difference sequence. 
In empirical applications, one resorts to Hansen’s test of over-identifying restriction to test these 
two assumptions.  
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estimate the same equation, but allowing for the measurement errors in variables, 
as well as relaxing the assumption for homoskedascticity in the error term. The 
GMM approach will entail two distinct treatments of the schooling factor, either 
predetermined or endogenous. All these results will be analyzed carefully along 
with the presentation. 
 
 
III. Discussion on Data, Variables, and Sample Limitations  
 
          The data set we use follows the one used in many related papers, typically 
in Griliches (1976) and later Blackburn and Neumark (1992). The source of data 
is the first round of the Young Men’s Cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey 
(NLS-Y)
9
. This cohort was first surveyed in 1966 at ages 14-24, with 5,225 
respondents, and the same set of young men was resurveyed at one-year intervals 
thereafter. The sample we used is restricted to non-black males, for several 
reasons discussed in Blackburn and Neumark (1992).
10
 By 1969, about ¼  of the 
original sample were lost (largely due to high social and spatial mobility) and 
many others damaged, but records of the 2,026 respondents to the 1969 earnings 
survey are complete enough to allow for derivation of all the variables concerned. 
The very reason we want to use this data set is its inclusion of two measures of 
ability: IQ and KWW, which are the scores from two intelligence tests. The IQ 
scores were collected as part of a survey of the respondents' schools conducted in 
1968. Because of administrative and record-keeping reasons, IQ data are missing 
for about one third of the sample resulting in only 1,362 individuals with IQ 
scores available in the year 1969. The KWW test examines respondents' 
knowledge about the labor market, covering the duties, educational attainment, 
and relative earnings of ten occupations.
11
 The KWW tests were administered as 
part of the initial survey, and hence are missing very infrequently. Based on the 
results of Griliches (1976), since KWW cannot be taken as independent of 
schooling, we describe its relationship to schooling by 
 2 2 2 2 2'KWW S A X          (6) 
                                                          
9 This data set is by far the most representative and comprehensive source that is accessible for 
analysis of the issue at hand. It was obtained from surveys on the U.S. civilian non-institutional 
population of males on a national scale. The repeated observations of the same individuals over 
time allow us to enhance the time consistency of our results. For more details of the sample, see the 
data release of the Bureau of Labor Statistics under the U.S. Department of Labor. We use the first 
round survey data instead of more recent ones because we note in the last section of Griliches’ 
classic paper in 1976 that after assuming for endogeneity of schooling, the behavior of the wage 
equation becomes not quite consistent with the previous set-up in that paper, one of such 
inconsistencies being the negative and significant IQ coefficient obtained. Motivated in this regard, 
we would like to reexamine the relevant data in an attempt to study what had been left over in that 
paper and other subsequent papers and try to establish any concrete arguments in a new research 
direction. Future works of the author will reexamine the results obtained in this paper with more 
recent data in an attempt to reach further conclusions, if possible. 
10 One obvious reason being there were much more data missing for blacks than for whites, making 
the sample size of complete observations including blacks too small for empirical studies and 
inferences. 
11 Details are given in Griliches (1976). While the KWW test is seemingly much different from an 
IQ test, Griliches (1976) found that least squares results for wage equations using IQ or KWW 
were quite similar. 
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Given the above equation and the assumption that KWW is orthogonal to the 
error term in the original wage equation, we introduce KWW as an instrument 
into the model for alleviation of the errors-in-variables bias illustrated in the 
previous section. To be more time-consistent, we study wages and their 
determinants at several points in time: from the year 1966 to the year 1973
12
, 
when that round of survey ended. In this way, we perform the regression using 
repeated observations of the same individuals over time. The requirements that 
wages be observed at several points in time, the exclusion of individuals with 
missing IQ data, the restriction to non-blacks, and other data availability 
requirements reduce the final sample size to 785. Although the data size has been 
largely reduced, such a number is still not too small for our purpose. Yet, the 
refinement of the original sample into this subset invokes potentially three 
primary sources of selection bias
13
, but since they tend not to be directly involved 
in the problem addressed in this paper, we work fine with the above refined 
sample. 
 
 
 
          The variables in the sample we will make use of in estimating the wage 
equation (2) are summarized in Table 1 (interpretation of variables are similar to 
Blackburn and Neumark (1992); their paper also has a detailed discussion of the 
motivation to choose these variables, which we will not repeat here). For future 
reference, characteristics of the sample are also summarized in Table 2 (in the 
year of 1969). 
 
          No data set is perfect, and this one has at least two major shortcomings: 
many data are missing, and the respondents are very young. To deal with the 
missing data problem, rather than imputing mean value to the missing 
observations or adding dummies corresponding to each set of missing 
observations for each of the independent variables (such were what some other 
researchers in the literature did), we just filter the original sample into a subset 
                                                          
12 Excluding the year 1972 because the survey data in that particular year were largely missing 
13 For detailed discussion, see Blackburn and Neumark (1992, Section III). 
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that is neither too large to allow for a complete inclusion of available data, nor 
too small for a large sample estimation. However, for the second problem, it 
exists as an endogenous limitation that is hardly reconcilable. We note that in the 
larger sample that contains 2,026 observations (corresponding to the available 
data by 1969’s earnings survey), the average age is only 22, though the range is 
from 17 to 27. Concerns are that at such early an age, the full effects of schooling 
or ability are not easily observable. Even if such effects can be observed with 
satisfactory accuracy, there are uncertainties of the individual futures to come 
that are far from a clear picture. Also, much of the labor force behavior of young 
men in the earlier part of such ages is characterized by search, experimentation, 
and often a lack of "seriousness."
14
 Thus, observations on their encounters with 
the labor market during these early years cannot be taken as reflecting 
exhaustively their underlying potential. Given such an inherent constraint, a full 
picture of the labor market returns to schooling and the relevant issues may be far 
from reach. Nevertheless, a glimmer of it is there, and that is what we are going 
to explore here. 
 
 
IV. Major Results 
 
          To present and discuss our major results, we first examine the results from 
a standard OLS approach, laying some grounds for compare and contrast. Then, 
we devote most part of this section to the examination of regression results in the 
GMM framework, from which we justify our arguments laid in the very 
beginning of this paper, and draw our major conclusions. 
                                                          
14 Pointed out in Griliches (1976), and reemphasized by Gronau (2003). 
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OLS Estimates 
 
          Table 3 summarizes the major results of applying standard OLS to our 
sample. Findings resemble Griliches (1976), with few distinctions, and here we 
only identify the ones worth noting related to our analysis: 
 
1. Note that the coefficients on year dummies are each statistically 
significant (at 1% level) and more importantly increasing in years (generally), 
which indicates an increasing trend in the respondents’ wages. This finding 
supports the consistency of intertemporal behavior of the wage equation we 
specified. 
2.   is 0.0620 and is statistically significant (at 1% level). Theoretically, 
as we have shown, such a coefficient on S should contain an upward bias, under 
reasonable conditions; the impact of years of schooling completed on wage 
determination would be overestimated. We note that the ―reasonable conditions‖ 
are indeed satisfied here given the standard errors estimated for schooling and IQ. 
One should also note that this coefficient can be interpreted as a measure of the 
rate of return on schooling, and in this case, the biased marginal return would be 
6.2%. 
 9 
3.  is 0.0027, which is also statistically significant (at 5% level). The 
positive coefficient implies a positive returns-to-IQ relation; higher IQ would 
raise one’s wage level, though the magnitude is small, only at a 0.27% level. 
4. Note that we differ from the conventional approach (estimate the 
equation multiple times by including different sets of variables) by only 
estimating the full version of the wage equation (including all variables specified 
simultaneously), for the reason that we are only interested in the overall behavior 
of the key explanatory variables under the OLS framework, which will be used as 
a reference frame in the following analysis. 
 
GMM Estimates with Predetermined Schooling 
 
          Table 4 summarizes the major results from applying GMM to the sample, 
in the case where schooling is assumed to be predetermined and only IQ is 
endogenous. The outside instruments are chosen to be KWW, MRT, MED and 
AGE. In this setting, several interesting findings arise: 
1. Note that the coefficients on year dummies are again each very 
significant (at 1% level) and increasing in years (generally), indicating an 
increasing trend in the respondents’ wages, which again supports the 
intertemporal consistency of the wage equation behavior. 
 
 10 
2.   is 0.0768 and is statistically significant (at 1% level). If the GMM is 
indeed efficient (the GMM assumptions hold), such a  should be statistically 
unbiased, which in other words suggests a downward ability bias rather than an 
upward bias caused by errors in ability measure under the standard OLS! (though 
the magnitude of the direction switch is not large) Although the literature has 
seen debates over the direction of the bias, there is seemingly a wider recognition 
for the upward potential; thus, the finding here may enhance the evidence of the 
potential downward bias if the GMM is indeed efficient. Note that previous 
papers concluding with a downward bias tend to be estimating the wage equation 
using cross-sectional data only. But in this paper, we exploit the NLS-Y data 
set’s panel feature, though only a tip of the iceberg, to estimate our wage 
equation with repeated observations of the same individual over time. Hopefully, 
such a temporal specification would draw stronger evidence on the downward 
bias of  . Nevertheless, even if the evidence of downward bias is extensive, we 
should only conclude with care that the direction of bias is confirmed, since the 
complicated interactions among explanatory variables in the wage equation make 
any causal relations in the model prone to contamination by the potentially 
additional OVB problem, errors-in-variables problem and the simultaneous 
causality problem. In fact, any evidence in this direction is by far only a stepping 
stone for a more comprehensive anatomy of the causal relation between 
schooling and wage in the wage equation.  
3. When we look at IQ, it is surprising to find that   in this case is actually 
negative, -0.0014! (though of only a very small magnitude) However, the 
negative coefficient might not require further interpretation given that the p value 
is huge, 0.7359, strongly suggesting a rejection of the null. Thus, the message is 
clear: under GMM framework, if the instruments are valid enough, we would 
have an unconventional result that the net effect of IQ on log wage is negligible! 
However surprising this may sound, we should first check for the critical 
assumptions underlying efficient GMM, which provide the theoretical grounds 
for any conclusions.   
 
          When we check for the validity of the efficient GMM assumptions, the 
Hansen’s test of over-identifying restriction produces a J statistic of the size 
74.1649
15
, with a negligible p value. This quickly rejects the tentative conclusion 
drawn above in part 2, also suggesting a need for reexamination of the direction 
of bias in part 1; the insignificant IQ coefficient may not suggest anything new 
but only again a misspecification of the instrumental variables, and the 
downward ability bias may also be a result of such a misspecification. Although 
the insignificance of IQ is rejected under the efficient GMM hypothesis, the 
possible direction of invalidity in ability measure delivers us a strong incentive to 
look for other possible specifications of the model under which such 
insignificance proves true. 
 
 
                                                          
15 Empirically, J statistic is never too small, indicating the fact that perfect instruments are mere 
luxuries. Nevertheless, the convention goes that if the J is not too large, the instruments can be held 
as reasonably valid up to certain degrees of tolerance of biasedness in the estimated model; in other 
words, we tolerate the potential biasedness within an appropriate degree and assume validity of the 
estimated relations in practice. Usually, a J no more than 10 already indicates an acceptable set of 
instruments. 
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GMM Estimates with Endogenous Schooling 
 
          Induced by the incentive above, we investigate the wage equation under 
GMM again but with a different specification of a key variable: we assume that 
schooling is endogenously determined within the wage-determining system. Thus, 
S  and IQ are now both endogenous, with the outside instruments unchanged. 
Indeed, the problem of endogeneity of schooling has been examined since 
decades ago in various papers.
16
 If one takes the view that the error term includes 
a host of unobservable individual characteristics that might affect the individual’s 
choice of schooling and quality of schooling, then schooling will be undoubtfully 
endogenous. Table 5 summarizes the major results: 
1. The coefficients on year dummies still exhibit an increasing time trend 
(generally), with each coefficient value being very significant (at 1% level). This 
again supports the time-consistent behavior of the specified wage equation. 
However, one may notice the die down of the trend compared to previous 
statistics in the last year, which is left unexplained. 
 
                                                          
16 More recent treatments can be referred to Maluccio (1998), Arrazola, De Hevia, Risueno and 
Sanz (2003), and Klein and Vella (2006). 
 12 
2.   is 0.1758 and is statistically significant (at 1% level). Again, if the 
GMM is indeed efficient, such a  should be statistically unbiased, and thus a 
downward bias is developed for the original OLS estimate rather than an upward 
bias. Noticeably, if indeed the downward bias is verified, the magnitude would 
be much larger than in the previous case, i.e., almost triple the value of  ! This 
suggests a much larger downward bias of   in the standard OLS caused by the 
errors in ability measure. However, this result is not surprising. Since we now 
assume for endogeneity of schooling in the wage equation, the simultaneous 
causality problem would automatically and largely inflate  , if not too much. 
Empirically, so high a return to schooling is a typical result of the endogeneity 
problem, reflecting much of the simultaneous impacts of education and income 
on each other.  
3. Compared to the issue of direction and magnitude of ability bias above, 
which has yet to be confirmed, we are much more interested in exploring the 
behavior of the ability measure, IQ, under this specification. As expected,  is 
indeed again negative, -0.0043, with a larger impact on wage than in the previous 
case. Yet, given a p value of the size 0.3804, we see again an insignificance of IQ 
displayed by our sample. However, before any efforts to conclude, we have to 
first verify the efficient GMM assumptions for a solid theoretical ground. 
 
          In this case, Hansen’s test of over-identifying restriction produces a J 
statistic of the size 11.9674, with a much larger p value than under the previous 
specification. As is discussed earlier, although such a J is still too large for 
perfect validity of all the efficient assumptions, it is by any means small enough 
to not reject the instruments as being reasonably acceptable. Empirically, a J 
statistic of this size already implies quite satisfactory conformity of the model to 
the efficient GMM assumptions. Given this, we believe that the endogenous 
schooling specification per se satisfies the efficient GMM reasonably well and 
thus any inferences we make from the results should not be easily rejected. To 
see a clearer picture of the fitness to reality of this specification, we perform the 
C-test on endogeneity of the schooling factor. The C statistic for our sample is 
58.1682, with a negligible p value. This tells us the story right away: schooling is 
indeed endogenous in our sample. In other words, the wage equation with 
endogenous schooling is indeed a better characterization of the schooling and 
wage relationship than the one with predetermined schooling. More generally, 
even though the first GMM specification fails to deliver the solidity of the 
interesting results obtained, the second specification not only delivers such 
solidity (in an acceptable way) but also proves to be a better specification per se 
than the former.  
 
          With such evidence at hand, we now go back to address the conjectures 
made above. Verified as stated, our sample exhibits a downward ability bias. 
Given the underlying endogeneity of schooling, return to schooling is about 
17.58%, which seems empirically exaggerated. Such a high return to schooling 
can be a typical result of the simultaneous causality problem between schooling 
and wage, which this paper has not tried to address. In the literature, the 
mounting concerns of this problem often boil down to one single empirical 
question: finding a valid instrument uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics 
but correlated with schooling so as to extract the exogenous schooling 
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component, which is often extremely difficult. However, it is worth noting that 
recent years have witnessed a methodological advance in microeconometrics and 
the ―Difference-in-Difference‖ strategy has now been applied to various topics in 
microeconomics, including the examination of returns-to-schooling. Duflo 
(2001), among others, has most noticeably applied the strategy to alleviate the 
problem of endogeneity and estimated a net effect of returns-to-schooling of the 
size 7.2%, which is an encouraging finding to most people. Though we recognize 
the importance to understand more in this research direction, we restrict our 
focus on the discussion of ability measure in this paper. 
 
          One may find it intriguing to have observed a statistically insignificant IQ 
factor in the wage-determining system, after confirming the endogeneity of 
schooling. It may be surprising to the majority that one’s IQ level per se has little, 
if at all, impact on his/her wage outcome. This may sound counter-intuitive: even 
if you are smarter than others, you may not earn as much as he/she does, let alone 
strictly more. However, one should note a critical qualification here that the 
result from our sample does not assert absolutely zero role of IQ in the wage 
equation unconditionally, but rather that the particular intelligence quotient you 
possess (the general individual cognitive ability), holding all other personal 
characteristics constant, may bear little weight on the determination of your 
income level, if at all. Inspired by several critical works in the fields of 
psychology, social behavior and mental science
17
, we argue that the 
insignificance of IQ found in our sample should not be referred to as a denial of 
any effects on income from individual ability in general, but should be 
interpreted as an indication of the fact that IQ is not a good measure at all of the 
ability we want to include in the wage equation, more specifically, the very 
ability to earn income.
18
 We believe that individual ability in general can be 
decomposed into several more specific components, each of which corresponds 
to a particular aspect of human life. Intelligence quotient, or more accurately the 
cognitive aspects of one’s mental functions such as memory and problem-solving, 
may be a good measure of one’s ability to score in examinations or achieve in 
academics, but not necessarily a good one of his/her mental ability to socialize, to 
work, or to simply survive (though IQ may have some effects on wage possibly 
through its influence on other components of the individual ability or other 
personal characteristics like the types of jobs engaged; in this case, the effects are 
not what we are talking about, i.e., the net effect of IQ per se). So under the 
efficient GMM setting, with largely eliminated bias in  , the net effect of IQ on 
wage should be negligible. If we believe in this story, it becomes natural that one 
would get an insignificant result of IQ in the wage equation we specified, and the 
reason is simple: you are using the wrong measurement to measure the wage-
earning ability. 
 
                                                          
17  Cote and Miners (2006), Petrides, Frederickson, and Furnham (2004), and Gardner (1983), 
among others 
18 Equation (3) actually allows for the possibility that IQ may not be an error-free measure of the 
relevant ability concept, but the empirical results obtained in this section suggest that the specified 
wage equation simply captures little of the realistic relationship between the ability we want to 
quantify and the most accessible measure we have—IQ. In other words, it is not that ability is 
measured with error by IQ, but that IQ simply should not be included in the equation as the 
measure of such ability at all. 
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          Other than the major results above, one more issue is worth noting: the 
negative IQ coefficient  . Although a simple t-test suggests IQ is statistically 
insignificant in both predetermined and endogenous schooling settings, the 
consistent results of a negative sign are still too interesting to ignore. Put aside 
the testing results, if we assume a negative  to be accepted, then our sample 
simply says that with all others equal, a higher IQ level per se will give you a 
lower level of expected income. This is pathetic! However, it may sound 
empirically stupid to conclude with such a remark as higher IQ reduces your 
income. Therefore, what went wrong? Although this paper has not tried to 
explore the possibilities in this regard, we conjecture that a closer look at the data 
may provide some clues, e.g., a comparison of subsamples of young men with 
different education levels within the 785-observation sample to examine the 
conditional effects of IQ on wage and test the difference in means to verify any 
possible group bias in the data. 
 
 
V. Conjecture on the Wage Equation 
 
          Following the logic from last section, it is believed that although IQ may 
be a good measure of one’s cognitive ability, it may not necessarily be a good 
proxy for the more specific component of ability that we are interested in—the 
very ability to earn income. So the problem now boils down to two questions: 1) 
What kind of individual ability should we include in the wage equation instead of 
IQ (or with IQ)? and 2) What should a better specification of the wage-
determining system be?  
 
Schooling and IQ 
 
          Before we try to answer these two questions, we carry on a short 
discussion on IQ in addition to the previous section. Note that in the standard 
OLS regression, the biasedness of slope coefficients allows for a positive and 
significant  . Given the results from efficient GMM, such a   cannot be a 
reflection of the net ability impact on wage but only a result of some unknown 
internal invalidities of the wage equation. Given this, one might naturally suspect 
a typical multicollinearity problem in schooling and IQ, which may take the form: 
 S IQ u     (7) 
Based on the sample of 785 observations we used, we obtain an 
2R  of the size 
0.4667. The F-test on this 
2R  produces an F statistic of the size 54.3205, which 
suggests a very strong linear relationship between schooling and IQ, confirming 
the multicollinearity concern.  Given such severe multicollinearity, the standard 
OLS would easily produce a statistically significant marginal impact of IQ on 
wage, which in this case should be understood as the ―impact IQ has on wage 
through schooling attainment‖. This is intuitive: even though IQ is not a good 
measure of the ability to earn income, it would be a reasonably good one to 
measure the intelligence one possesses in terms of passing exams and doing well 
in course work. Therefore, even though IQ per se has little effect on wages, we 
would expect a statistically significant impact of IQ on wage in an OLS set-up 
through its positive correlation with schooling and schooling’s positive 
correlation with wage. This attends to our previous argument: even though IQ 
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has a positive impact on wage in an OLS regression, once we apply the efficient 
GMM and reduce estimation bias as much as possible, the net effect of IQ on 
wage is negligible. The result here also echoes the remark made earlier: although 
the net effect of IQ may be negligible, the presence of IQ differentials may still 
influence the wage-determining behavior of the wage equation, through its 
relations with education attainment, other individual ability components, or some 
personal characteristics like the types of jobs engaged. Consequently, a complete 
exclusion of the IQ component from the wage equation may shut down many 
possible channels, which would not be a wise choice after all. Typically, we can 
characterize the observed correlation between schooling and IQ by the following 
equation: 
 3 3 3'S IQ X      (8) 
where X is again a vector of control variables allowing for other possible factors  
that have a correlation with schooling. 
 
Emotional Intelligence 
 
          Now we attempt to explore the two questions posed at the beginning of this 
section. To identify an appropriate measure for the specific ability to earn income, 
one may be more concerned with an individual’s ability to fit into the work place, 
on top of satisfactory task completion. Indeed, even if one possesses high IQ, 
he/she may not be able to realize his/her personal value and earn the return he/she 
desires if he/she cannot fit into the work place, cooperate with colleagues, and 
maintain good self-discipline. Extensive evidence
19
 from the fields of intelligence 
studies, social psychology and organizational behavior has pointed towards the 
same empirical fact that non-cognitive ability, such as self control, empathy, and 
interpersonal relation management, could play a far more dominant role than IQ 
in the determination of not only one’s income from work but also his/her career 
prospects and professional development, and even the success of an organization. 
In 1983, Howard Gardner’s Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple 
Intelligences introduced the idea of multiple intelligences, which include 
both ―interpersonal intelligence‖ (the capacity to understand the intentions, 
motivations and desires of other people) and ―intrapersonal intelligence‖ (the 
capacity to understand oneself, to appreciate one's feelings, fears and motivations) 
besides IQ. In Gardner's view, traditional types of intelligence, such as IQ, fail to 
fully explain one’s mental abilities. In the recent decade, the above ideas have 
been popularized in the academia as well as in the workplace through the 
introduction and diffusion of a collective measure of non-cognitive ability, the 
emotional intelligence (EI)
20
. Increasing recent evidence has shown that EI may 
be a better measure of workplace ability than IQ and is usually more relevant to 
job performance. (Jayan 2006, Cote and Miners 2006, and Law, Wong, and 
Huang 2008) Most noticeably, the results of Cote and Miners (2006) conclude 
                                                          
19 Such evidence can be found in the following works: Thorndike, E. L. (1920), Wechsler, David 
(1940), Mayer, J.D. and Salovey, P. (1997), Weisinger, H. (1998), Fox, S. and Spector, P.E. (2000), 
Daus, C.S. and Ashkanasy, N.M. (2005), Lyons, J.B. and  Schneider, T.R. (2005). 
20 Emotional intelligence describes the ability, capacity, skill or, in the case of the trait EI model, a 
self-perceived grand ability to identify, assess, manage and control the emotions of one's self, of 
others, and of groups (Bradberry and Greaves, 2009). Several standard tests have been developed 
so far to quantify the subject, among which the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso EI Test is the most popular. 
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with the observation that employees with higher EI tend to have higher task 
performance and organizational citizenship, and thus their compensations, even if 
they are the ones with lower IQ. Motivated in this regard, we are interested in 
exploring the possibilities of EI being a better measure of the ability to earn 
income. In other words, we conjecture that EI could be a statistically significant 
explanatory variable originally omitted in the wage equation, the inclusion of 
which may reasonably improve the model’s fit to reality and allow us to have a 
more accurate estimation about the net marginal contribution to wage from an 
individual’s relevant wage-earning ability. 
 
Augmented Wage Equation 
 
Given the analysis above, we proceed to offer our conjecture on a better 
functional form of the critical log wage equation. Since we have shown the 
necessity of inclusion of IQ albeit the insignificance of its net effect, and realized 
that EI may be a better measure of the ability to earn income, we augment the 
equation to include both IQ and EI as explanatory variables: 
 'I ELW S IQ EI X          (9) 
And in order to give a closed form specification of the wage equation, we define 
the general ability A  by the following equation, which include the wage-earning 
ability measure EI, the cognitive ability measure IQ, and the outside ability 
measure KWW serving as an instrument in GMM estimates: 
 0 1 2 3A b b IQ b EI b KWW e      (10) 
In addition to the closed form requirement, in order to reveal the inherent relation 
between IQ and EI, we should as well specify the exact functional form of the 
relation. This allows us to examine any cross effects of the two terms in the 
augmented equation, making it possible to analyze the interactions of one’s 
different aspects of ability in a tractable form. In fact, there are many models in 
the literature of intelligence studies concerning the exact categorization of human 
intelligence, but as we prefer to limit the purpose of this paper, we will not 
extend our discussions to include further issues in detail but would leave the task 
of finding an appropriate functional form of the relation to future research, while 
only indicate such a requirement by the following implicit function: 
 ( , ) 0f IQ EI   (11) 
Given such modified specifications, equations (8)-(11) constitute a new system 
of wage determination that can be studied in a tractable way and estimated in 
both structural and reduced form. In this case, one can either 1) drop EI to obtain 
the original wage equation specified for analysis in the previous sections so as to 
verify for the ―insignificance of IQ‖ conclusion; or 2) drop IQ to obtain an 
estimate of the net effect of EI on wage, to examine the statistic significance of 
such an ability measure in wage determination, to verify the assumption that EI is 
a better measure of the wage-earning ability, to analyze the directions and 
magnitudes of the marginal impacts of all other explanatory variables, and to 
possibly identify any potentially additional biases introduced into the wage 
equation by the inclusion of EI; or 3) estimate the equation in the presence of 
both IQ and EI simultaneously, to reexamine EI about the issues raised in 2) in 
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the presence of an endogenous IQ, to identify any possible new channels through 
which IQ can affect wage after the inclusion of EI, to examine the cross effects, 
if any, between EI and IQ so as to understand better the interactions among 
different aspects of individual ability, to test the endogeneity of schooling 
assumption again under this set-up, and to examine the overall fitness of this 
specification to the reality. 
21
 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
          This paper builds on the progress of several classic studies of returns-to-
schooling, but asks a different question from the traditional inquiries, in the 
direction of ability measure per se, i.e., what should be interpreted from the 
individual ability in the wage equation? Motivated by several historically 
important issues in the area, we answer this question by taking a very simple 
stance: IQ level per se has negligible effect in determining one’s income level as 
measured by hourly wage. We utilized a sample of well documented national 
surveys on young men’ cohort in the U.S. between 1960s and 1970s to perform 
an empirical study of the problem concerned: whether IQ is statistically 
significant in the estimation. We analyze the data under three frameworks (OLS, 
GMM with predetermined schooling and GMM with endogenous schooling) to 
compare and contrast, and derive our major results in Section IV, including the 
central result that confirms the insignificance of net IQ effect in the wage-
determining system. We have also drawn some other interesting conclusions and 
implications from the empirical results obtained, including the direction of ability 
bias, time consistency of wage-earning behavior, endogeneity of schooling 
decisions, possibly negative marginal impact of IQ, and the multicollinearity in 
IQ and schooling. In order to provide possible directions for future research, we 
have also made a conjecture on the wage equation (the wage-determining system) 
towards the end of this paper and propose emotional intelligence as a better 
wage-earning ability measure to coexist with IQ in an augmented wage equation 
to enrich the interactive effects and dynamic behavior of the wage-determining 
process. We hope that the proposal can be implemented in future studies and the 
conjecture be tested with empirical data, which is our work that ensues. 
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